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Abstract. Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) is a variant of the classical
Stable Marriage problem, where the robustness of a given stable match-
ing is measured by the number of modifications required for repairing
it in case an unforeseen event occurs. We focus on the complexity of
finding an (a, b)-supermatch. An (a, b)-supermatch is defined as a stable
matching in which if any a (non-fixed) men/women break up it is pos-
sible to find another stable matching by changing the partners of those
a men/women and also the partners of at most b other couples. In order
to show deciding if there exists an (a, b)-supermatch is NP-complete, we
first introduce a SAT formulation that is NP-complete by using Schae-
fer’s Dichotomy Theorem. Then, we show the equivalence between the
SAT formulation and finding a (1, 1)-supermatch on a specific family of
instances.
1 Introduction
Matching under preferences is a multidisciplinary family of problems, mostly
studied by the researchers in the field of economics and computer science. There
are many variants of the matching problems such as College Admission, Hospi-
tal/Residents, Stable Marriage, Stable Roommates, etc.The reader is referred to
the book written by Manlove for a comprehensive background on the subject [1].
We work on the robustness notion of stable matching proposed by Genc et.
al. [2]. In the context of Stable Marriage, the purpose is to find a matching M be-
tween men and women such that no pair ⟨man,woman⟩ prefer each other to their
situations in M . The authors of [2] introduced the notion of (a, b)-supermatch
as a measure of robustness. An (a, b)-supermatch is a stable matching such that
if any a agents (men or woman) break up it is possible to find another stable
matching by changing the partners of those a agents with also changing the
partners of at most b other couples. However, they leave the complexity of this
problem open [2].
The focus of this paper is to study the complexity of finding an (a, b)-
supermatch. In order to show that the general case of RSM, which is the decision
of existence of an (a, b)-supermatch, is NP-complete, it is sufficient to show that
a restricted version of the general problem is NP-complete. Thus, we first show
that the decision problem for finding a (1, 1)-supermatch on a restricted family
of instances is NP-complete, then we generalize this complexity result to the
general case. Proofs and details in this paper are mostly omitted due to space
restrictions. The details can be found in our technical paper [3].
2 Notations & Background
An instance of the Stable Marriage problem (with incomplete lists) takes as input
a set of men U = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn1} and a set of women W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn2}
where each person has an ordinal preference list over members of the opposite
sex. For the sake of simplicity we suppose in the rest of the paper that n1 = n2. A
pair ⟨mi, wj⟩ is acceptable if wj (respectively mi) appears in the preference list
of mi (respectively wj). A matching is a set of acceptable pairs where each man
(respectively woman) appears at most once in any pair of M . If ⟨mi, wj⟩ ∈ M ,
we say that wj (respectively mi) is the partner of mi (respectively wj) and
then we denote M(mi) = wj and M(wj) = mi. A pair ⟨mi, wj⟩ (sometimes
denoted as ⟨i, j⟩) is said to be blocking a matching M if mi prefers wj to M(mi)
and wj prefers mi to M(wj). A matching M is called stable if there exists no
blocking pair for M . A pair ⟨mi, wj⟩ is said to be stable if it appears in a stable
matching. A pair ⟨mi, wj⟩ is called fixed if ⟨mi, wj⟩ appears in every stable
matching. In this case, the man mi and woman wj are called fixed. In the rest
of the paper we use n to denote the number of non-fixed men and I be an
instance of a Stable Marriage problem. We measure the distance between two
stable matchings Mi,Mj by the number of men that have different partners in
Mi and Mj , denoted by d(Mi,Mj).
Formally, a stable matching M is said to be (a, b)-supermatch if for any set
Ψ ⊂ M of a stable pairs that are not fixed, there exists a stable matching M ′
such that M ′ ∩ Ψ = ∅ and d(M,M ′)− a ≤ b [2].
Definition 1 (π1) INPUT: a, b ∈ N, and a Stable Marriage instance I.
QUESTION: Is there an (a, b)-supermatch for I?
Let M be a stable matching. A rotation ρ = (⟨mk0 , wk0⟩, ⟨mk1 , wk1⟩, . . . ,
⟨mkl−1 , wkl−1⟩) (where l ∈ N∗) is an ordered list of pairs in M such that changing
the partner of each man mki to the partner of the next man mki+1 (the operation
+1 is modulo l) in the list ρ leads to a stable matching denoted by M/ρ. The
latter is said to be obtained after eliminating ρ from M . In this case, we say
that ⟨mli , wli⟩ is eliminated by ρ, whereas ⟨mli , wli+1⟩ is produced by ρ, and
that ρ is exposed on M . If a pair ⟨mi, wj⟩ appears in a rotation ρ, we denote
it by ⟨mi, wj⟩ ∈ ρ. Additionally, if a man mi appears at least in one of the
pairs in the rotation ρ, we say mi is involved in ρ. There exists a partial order
for rotations. A rotation ρ′ is said to precede another rotation ρ (denoted by
ρ′ ≺≺ ρ), if ρ′ is eliminated in every sequence of eliminations that starts at M0
and ends at a stable matching in which ρ is exposed [4]. Note that this relation
is transitive, that is, ρ′′ ≺≺ ρ′ ∧ ρ′ ≺≺ ρ =⇒ ρ′′ ≺≺ ρ. Two rotations are said
to be incomparable if one does not precede the other.
The structure that represents all rotations and their partial order is a directed
graph called rotation poset denoted by Π = (V, E). Each rotation corresponds
to a vertex in V and there exists an edge from ρ′ to ρ if ρ′ precedes ρ. There
are two different edge types in a rotation poset: type 1 and type 2 . Suppose
⟨mi, wj⟩ is in rotation ρ, if ρ′ is the unique rotation that moves mi to wj then
(ρ′, ρ) ∈ E and ρ′ is called a type 1 predecessor of ρ. If ρ moves mi below wj ,
and ρ′ ̸= ρ is the unique rotation that moves wj above mi, then (ρ′, ρ) ∈ E and
ρ′ is called a type 2 predecessor of ρ [4]. A node that has no outgoing edges is
called a leaf node and a node that has no incoming edges is called root node.
A closed subset S is a set of rotations such that for any rotation ρ in S,
if there exists a rotation ρ′ that precedes ρ then ρ′ is also in S. Every closed
subset in the rotation poset corresponds to a stable matching [4]. Let L(S) be
the set of rotations that are the leaf nodes of S. Similarly, let N(S) be the set
of the rotations that are not in S, but all of their predecessors are in S. This
can be illustrated as having a cut in the graph Π, where the cut divides Π into
two sub-graphs, namely Π1 and Π2. If there are any comparable nodes between
Π1 and Π2, Π1 is the part that contains the preceding rotations. Eventually, Π1
corresponds to the closed subset S, L(S) corresponds to the leaf nodes of Π1
and N(S) corresponds to the root nodes of Π2.
Let us illustrate these terms on a sample SM instance specified by the pref-
erence lists of 7 men/women in Table 1 given by Genc et. al [2]. For the sake
of clarity, each man mi is denoted with i and each woman wj with j. Figure 2
represents the rotation poset and all the rotations associated with this sample.
m0 0 6 5 2 4 1 3 w0 2 1 6 4 5 3 0
m1 6 1 4 5 0 2 3 w1 0 4 3 5 2 6 1
m2 6 0 3 1 5 4 2 w2 2 5 0 4 3 1 6
m3 3 2 0 1 4 6 5 w3 6 1 2 3 4 0 5
m4 1 2 0 3 4 5 6 w4 4 6 0 5 3 1 2
m5 6 1 0 3 5 4 2 w5 3 1 2 6 5 4 0
m6 2 5 0 6 4 3 1 w6 4 6 2 1 3 0 5
Table 1. Preference lists for men
(left) and women (right) for a sam-
ple instance of size 7.
Table 2. Rotation poset of the in-
stance given in Table 1.
In this example, M1 = {(0, 2), (1, 4), (2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 0), (6, 5)} is a sta-
ble matching. The closed subset S2 = {ρ0, ρ1} corresponds to M1/ρ1 = M2 =
{(0, 2), (1, 5), (2, 6), (3, 3), (4, 1), (5, 4), (6, 0)}. For M2, leaf and neighbor nodes
can be identified as L(S2) = {ρ1} and N(S2) = {ρ2, ρ4}.
3 A specific problem family
In this section, we describe a restricted, specific family F of Stable Marriage
instances over properties on its generic rotation poset ΠF = (VF , EF ).
Property 1 Each rotation ρi ∈ VF , contains exactly 2 pairs ρi = (⟨mi1, wi1⟩,
⟨mi2, wi2⟩).
Property 2 Each rotation ρi ∈ VF , has at most 2 predecessors and 2 successors.
Property 3 Each edge ei ∈ EF , is a type 1 edge.
Property 4 For each man mi, i ∈ [1, n], mi is involved in at least 2 rotations.
Lemma 1. For each two different paths P1 and P2 defined on ΠF , where both
start at rotation ρs, end at ρt, and the pair ⟨me, wf ⟩ ∈ ρs, if all rotations on
P1 (respectively P2) contain me, at least one of the rotations on P2 (respectively
P1) does not contain wf .
Definition 2 (πF1 ) A particular case of π1, with the restrictions from problem
family F.
In order to prove that the general problem π1 is NP-complete, we first show
that the restricted family problem πF1 is NP-complete. In order to do this, we
prove it for a particular case noted πF2 .
Definition 3 (π2) The special case of π1, where a = 1, b = 1.
Definition 4 (πF2 ) INPUT: A Stable Marriage instance I from family F.
QUESTION: Is there a (1, 1)-supermatch for I?
4 Complexity results
In order to show that πF2 is NP-complete, we first need to define a particular
SAT problem denoted by SAT-SM which is NP-complete.
SAT-SM takes as input a set of integers χ = [1, |χ|], n lists l1, l2, . . . , ln
where n ∈ N∗ and each la (a ∈ [1, n]) is an ordered list of integers of χ, and
three sets of distinct Boolean variables Y = {ye | e ∈ χ}, S = {se | e ∈ χ}, and
P = {pe | e ∈ χ}}.
Conditions on the lists: The lists l1, . . . ln as subject to the following constraints:
First, ∀a ∈ [1, n], la is denoted by (χa1 , . . . , χakla ), where kla = |la| ≥ 2. Second,
each element of χ appears in exactly two different lists. For illustration, the set
χ represents the indexes of rotations and a list la represents the index of each
rotation having the man ma. The order in la specifies the path in the rotation
poset from the first rotation to the last one for a man ma. And the restriction
for having each index in two different lists is related to Property 1.
In addition to those two conditions, we have the following rule over the lists:
[Rule 1] For any χmi and χ
m
j from the same list lm where m ∈ [1, n] and j > i,
there does not exist any sequence S that starts at χmi and ends at χ
m
j constructed
by iterating the two consecutive rules σ and θ below:
σ) given χae ∈ S, the next element in S is χae+1, where e+ 1 ≤ kla .
θ) given χae ∈ S, the next element in S is χbf , where χae = χbf , a ̸= b ∈ [1, n],
and 1 ≤ f ≤ klb .
Conditions on the clauses: The CNF that defined SAT-SM is a conjunction of
four groups of clauses: A , B , C and D . The groups are subject to the following
conditions:
A : For any list la, a ∈ [1, n], (χa1 , . . . , χakla ), we have a disjunction between




i=1 yχai ∨ pχai
)
.
B : For any list la, a ∈ [1, n], (χa1 , . . . , χakla ), we have a disjunction between
two S-elements with consecutive indexes defined by
∧kla−1
i=1 sχai ∨ ¬sχai+1 .
C : This group of clauses is split in two. For any list la, a ∈ [1, n], (χa1 , . . . , χakla ),
the first sub-group C1 contains all the clauses defined by the logic formula∧kla−1










The second sub-group C2 has three specific cases according to the position
of elements in the ordered lists. As fixed above, each element of χ appears in
exactly two different lists. Thus, for any e ∈ χ, there exists two lists la and lb
such that χai = χ
b
j = e, where i ∈ [1, kla ] and j ∈ [1, klb ]. For each couple of
elements of χ denoted by (χai , χ
b
j) that are equal to the same value e, we define



















D : Similarly, for each couple of elements of χ denoted by (χai , χ
b
j) equal
to the same value e, we define a clause with these elements and the previous































To conclude the definition, the full CNF formula of SAT-SM is A ∧ B
∧ C1 ∧ C2 ∧ D .
The SAT-SM problem is the question of finding an assignment of the Boolean
variables that satisfies the above CNF formula.
Theorem 1. The SAT-SM problem is NP-complete.
Proof. SAT-SM is NP-complete by using Schaefer’s dichotomy theorem [5].
Details of the full proof can be found in the technical paper [3].
Theorem 2. The decision problem πF2 is NP-complete.
Proof. The verification is shown to be polynomial-time decidable [2]. Therefore,
πF2 is in NP. We show that πF2 is NP-complete by presenting a polynomial
reduction from the SAT-SM problem to πF2 as follows.
From an instance ISSM of SAT-SM, we construct in polynomial time an
instance I of πF2 . This means the construction of the rotation poset ΠF =
(VF , EF ) with all stable pairs in the rotations, and the preference lists.
We first start constructing the set of rotations VF and then proceed by de-
ciding which man is a part of which stable pair in which rotation. First, ∀e ∈ χ,
we have a corresponding rotation ρe. Second, ∀la, a ∈ [1, n],∀χai ∈ [1, kla ], we
insert ma as the man to the first empty pair in rotation ρχai . Each man of π
F
2 is
involved in at least two rotations (satisfying Property 4).
As each χai appears in exactly two different lists la and lb, each rotation is
guaranteed to contain exactly two pairs involving different menma,mb (Property
1), and to possess at most two predecessors and two successors in ΠF (Property
2).
For the construction of the set of arcs EF , for each couple of elements of χ
denoted by (χai , χ
a
i+1), a ∈ [1, n],∀i ∈ [1, kla − 1], we add an arc from ρχai to
ρχa
i+1
. Note that this construction, yields in each arc in E representing a type
1 relationship (Property 3).Because each arc links two rotations, where exactly
one of the men is involved in both rotations. Now, in order to complete the
rotation poset ΠF , the women involved in rotations must also be added. The
following procedure is used to complete the rotation poset:
1. For each element χa1 ∈ χ, with a ∈ [1, n], let ρχa1 be the rotation that
involves man ma. In this case, the partner of ma in ρχa1 is completed by
inserting woman wa, so that the resulting rotation contains the stable pair
⟨ma, wa⟩ ∈ ρχl
1
.
2. We perform a breadth-first search on the rotation poset from the completed
rotations. For each complete rotation ρ = (⟨mi, wb⟩, ⟨mk, wd⟩) ∈ VF , let ρs1
(resp. ρs2) be one of the successor of ρ and modifying mi (resp. mk). If ρs1
exists, then we insert the woman wd in ρs1 as the partner of man mi. In the
same manner, if ρs2 exists, we insert the woman wb in ρs2 as the partner
of man mk. The procedure creates at most two stable pairs. From the fact
that each woman wb appears in the next rotation as partnered with the next
man of the current rotation ρ, in the SAT-SM definition it is equivalent to
going from χiy to χ
k




z , y ∈ [1, []n], z ∈ [1, n−1]. Thus
the path where the woman appears follow a sequence defined as the one in
[Rule 1] from the SAT-SM definition. By this rule, we can conclude that
Lemma 1 is satisfied.
All along the construction, we showed that all the properties required, to
have a valid rotation poset from the family F, are satisfied. Using this process
we are adding equal number of women and men in the rotation poset.
The last step to obtain an instance I of πF2 is the construction of the pref-
erence lists. By using the rotation poset created above, we can construct incom-
plete preference lists for the men and women. We use a similar approach to a
procedure previously defined by Gusfield et. al. for creating the lists [6]:
– Apply topological sort on VF .
– For each man mi ∈ [1, n], insert woman wi as the most preferred to mi’s
preference list.
– For each woman wi ∈ [1, n], insert man mi as the least preferred to wi’s
preference list.
– For each rotation ρ ∈ VF in the ordered set, for each pair ⟨mi, wj⟩ produced
by ρ, insert wj to the man mi’s list in decreasing order of preference ranking.
Similarly, place mi to wj ’s list in increasing order of preference ranking.
The Lemma 1 imposed on our rotation poset clearly involves that each pref-
erence list contains each member of the opposite sex at most once. To finish, one
can observe that the instance obtained respects the Stable Marriage require-
ments and the specific properties from problem family F.
⇐ Suppose that there exists a solution to an instance I of the decision
problem πF2 . Then we have a (1, 1)-supermatch and its corresponding closed
subset S. As defined in Section 2, L(S) is the set of leaf nodes of S, N(S) the
set of nodes such that all their predecessors are in S but not themselves. From
these two sets, we can assign all the literals in ISSM as follows:
– For each rotation ρi ∈ L(S), set yi = true. Otherwise, set yi = false.
– For each rotation ρi ∈ S, set si = true. Otherwise, set si = false.
– For each rotation ρi ∈ N(S), set pi = true. Otherwise, set pi = false.
If S represents a (1, 1)-supermatch, that means by removing only one rotation
present in L(S) or by only adding one rotation from N(S), any pair of the
corresponding stable matching can be repaired with no additional modifications.
Thus any men must be contained in a leaf or a neighbor node. This leads to
having for each man one of the literals assigned to true in his list in SAT-SM.
Therefore every clause in A are satisfied.
For the clauses in B , for any man’s list the clauses are forcing each si literal
to be true if the next one si+1 is. By definition of a closed subset, from any leaf
of S, all the preceding rotations (indexes in the lists) must be in S. And thus
every clause in B is satisfied.
As the clauses in C altogether capture the definition of being a leaf node of
S, they are all satisfied by L(S). At last, for the clauses in D , it is also easy to
see that any rotation being in N(S) is equivalent to not being in the solution
and having predecessors in. Thus all the clauses are satisfied.
Thus we can conclude that this assignment satisfy the SAT formula of ISSM .
⇒ Suppose that there exists a solution to an instance ISSM of the decision
problem SAT-SM. Thus we have a valid assignment to satisfy the SAT formula
of ISSM . We construct a closed subset S to solve I. As previously, we use the
sets L(S) and N(S), then for each literal yi assigned to true, we put the rotation
ρi in L(S). We are doing the same for pi and si as above.
The clauses in B enforce the belonging to S of all rotations preceding any
element of S, thus the elements in S form a closed subset. To obtain a (1, 1)-
supermatch, we have to be sure we can repair any couple by removing only one
rotation present in L(S) or by only adding one rotation from N(S). The clauses
in C enforce the rotations in L(S) to be without successors in S. And in the
same way the clauses in D enforce the rotations in N(S) to not be in S but
have their predecessors in the solution.
Now we just have to check that all the men are contained in at least one
rotation from L(S) ∪ N(S). By the clauses from A , we know that at least one
ye or pe for any manmi is assigned to true. Thus from this closed subset S, we can
repair any couple ⟨mi, wj⟩ in one modification by removing/adding the rotation
having mi. Since there exists a 1− 1 equivalence between a stable matching and
the closed subset in the rotation poset, we have a (1, 1)-supermatch. □
Corollary 1 From the Theorem 2 and by generality, both decision problems π1
and π2 are NP-complete.
5 Concluding Remarks
We study the complexity of the Robust Stable Marriage (RSM) problem. In order
to show that given a Stable Marriage instance, deciding if there exists an (a, b)-
supermatch is NP-complete, we first introduce a SAT formulation which models
a specific family of Stable Marriage instances. We show that the formulation is
NP-complete by Schaefer’s Dichotomy Theorem. Then we apply a reduction
from this problem to prove the NP-completeness of RSM.
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